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SECURITIES ARBITRATION: 
RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES 
BETWEEN SECURITIES BROKERS 
AND THEIR CUSTOMERS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Wilko v. Swan l declared the Supreme Court's unwillingness 
to enforce predispute agreements to arbitrate claims arising 
from violations of the Securities Act of 1933,2 evidencing their 
mistrust of the system of arbitration.s Over nearly four decades, 
the holding of Wilko has been slowly eroded,· creating uncer-
tainty as to the enforceability of arbitration agreements between 
brokers and their clients. Now, however, arbitrating the disputes 
that arise from the relationship between a securities broker and 
their clients is no longer subject to uncertainty where there has 
been a predispute agreement to arbitrate. In its recent decision 
in Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express," the Su-
preme Court held that such agreements to arbitrate disputes 
arising under the Securities Act of 1933 are enforceable, ex-
pressly overruling Wilko v. Swan.6 
This comment will explore the arbitration of securities dis-
putes between securities brokers and their customers, showing 
1. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
2. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm(1988». 
3. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-36. The Court stated "[the) effectiveness [of the Se-
curities Act) in application is lessened in arbitration as compared to judicial proceed-
ings." Id. See also, Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233 
(1987). 
4. For a discussion of cases that led up to the Supreme Court's overruling of Wilko, 
see infra notes 36-67 and accompanying text. See also, Bedell & Bosch, The Rodriguez 
Decision: A New Tradition In The Arbitration of Securities Disputes, 18 SEC. REG. L.J. 
53 (1990); Malcolm & Segall, The Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under Section lO(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act: Should Wilko Be Extended?, 50 ALB. L.R. 725 (1986). 
5. Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989). 
6. Id. at 1922. 
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that the investor today is fully protected in an arbitral forum 
and that the advantages to the investor who arbitrates a claim 
against their broker are expansive. 
The comment will begin with a brief overview of the three 
major components? which the courts have struggled with in an 
effort to reconcile and harmonize with one another. The first 
component is The Arbitration Act of 19258 which expressed the 
legislature's intent to recognize and codify the viability of arbi-
tration as an alternative to settling disputes in a forum other 
than a judicial one. The other two components of this trilogy are 
the Securities Act of 19339 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
193410 which were intended to provide protection for buyers of 
securities when dealing with sellers, with whom they may not be 
dealing at arms length. ll From Wilko to Rodriguez De Quijas, 
there is a rich judicial history which traces the evolution of arbi-
trating disputes between securities brokers and their clients, 
showing the interrelationship of the three Acts, and the 
problems that the court has had in trying to reconcile them. 
The comment will then examine the actual predispute 
agreements to arbitrate contained within customer agreements 
and the extent of the claims that are covered, including Securi-
ties Act and Securities Exchange Act violations and the Racket-
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).I2 This 
section of the comment will also look at how the standard de-
fenses of fraud, duress, and misrepresentation affect predispute 
arbitration agreements. IS 
7. Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 
Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988)) and the Federal Arbitration Act of 
1925, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982)). 
See infra sec. II and notes 11-31. 
8. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as 
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982)). 
9. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
77a-77mm (1988)). 
10. 'Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291,48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988)). 
11. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435. "While a buyer and seller of securities, under some 
circumstances, may deal at arms's length on equal terms, it is clear that the Securities 
Act was drafted with an eye to the disadvantages under which buyers labor." [d. at 435. 
12. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964 
(1988). 
13. See infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text. 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol21/iss2/7
1991] SECURITIES ARBITRATION 407 
The comment will conclude that with the uncertainty of the 
enforceability of arbitration clauses contained within customer 
agreements resolved,14 the advantages of arbitration will out-
weigh the disadvantages and provide for more adequate and effi-
cient resolution of disputes between securities brokers and their 
clients. In Rodriguez De Quijas, the Supreme Court correctly 
recognized the important advantages of arbitrating securities 
disputes between brokers and their clients,15 and thereby finally 
recognized and harmonized the legislative schemes of the Securi-
ties Acts and the Arbitration Act. 
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
A. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT OF 1925 
Understanding the motivation and intent of the legislature 
in enacting the Federal Arbitration Act of 192516 (FAA) is essen-
tial in order to see how and why the courts finally overruled the 
incorrect decision of Wilko.17 Congress clearly saw the need to 
put arbitration agreements "upon the same footing as other con-
tracts, where it belongs. illS In acting on this need, Congress evi-
denced its primary intent in passing the statute, to enable per-
sons to enforce agreements to arbitrate to which they are a 
party.19 Congress was also aware of the many benefits that would 
accompany the passage of the FAA,20 including saving the time 
and expense involved in litigation, realizing that the FAA would 
alleviate some of these problems.21 
14. See Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1922; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242. 
15. See infra notes 100-122 and accompanying text. 
16. See Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985) (quoting H.R. REP. 
No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924)); see also Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. 
Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
17. Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1922 (1989). The Court stated: "We now conclude that 
Wilko was incorrectly decided and is inconsistent with the prevailing uniform construc-
tion of other federal statutes governing arbitration agreements in the setting of business 
transactions." [d. See also infra note 66. 
18. Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 219 (1985) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96, 
68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 1924)). 
19. [d. at 220. The court in Byrd also rejected the suggestion that the overriding 
goal of the Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious resolution of claims, noting 
that the "purpose behind its passage was to ensure judicial enforcement of privately 
made agreements to arbitrate". [d. at 219. 
20. [d. at 220. 
21. The House Report observed: "It is practically appropriate that the action should 
be taken at this time when there is so much agitation against the costliness and delays of 
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Regardless of what Congress envisioned and intended in the 
passage of the FAA, the court in Wilko displayed suspicion of 
the arbitration process as "a method of weakening the protec-
tions afforded by the substantive law to would be com-
plaintents .... "22 After Wilko, this "old judicial hostility to ar-
bitration"23 began to disappear, the mistrust of arbitration as an 
alternative form of dispute resolution eroded, and the courts be-
gan adhering to the legislative intent of the FAA. The courts 
began to recognize the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion agreements"2' and subsequently declared that it must "rig-
orously enforce agreements to arbitrate."21i Thus, a trend of 
favoring the enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements 
in securities disputes began gaining momentum soon after Wilko 
was decided and has continued up through Rodriguez. 
With their rigorous enforcement of the spirit and intent ot 
the FAA, the courts have remained faithful to Congress's man-
date by restraining hostile impulses against the arbitration of se-
curities disputes and enforcement of predispute agreements to 
arbitrate.26 
B. THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE 
ACT OF 1934 
Congress saw the need to pass legislation, in the wake of the 
stock market crash in 1929 and an ailing economy, that would 
afford protections to investors and assist in healing this coun-
try's troubled and depressed economy.27 They passed the Securi-
litigation. These matters can be largely eliminated by agreements for arbitration, if arbi-
tration agreements made valid and enforceable." HR REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 
(1924). 
22. Rodriguez De Quijas, 109 S. Ct at 1920. "[Wilko's suspicion of arbitration) has 
fallen far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favor-
ing this method of resolving disputes." Id. 
23. Rodriguez De Quijas, 109 S. Ct. at 1920, quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. 
Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942). 
24. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. at 
24; see also supra note' 11. 
25. Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221. 
26. See e.g., Rodriguez De Quijas, 109 S. Ct. at 1920; Securities Industry Assn. v. 
Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989). 
27. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979) ("[T)he Act emerged as 
part of the aftermath of the market crash in 1929 ... Congress' primary contemplation 
was that regulation of the securities markets might help set the economy on the road to 
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. ties Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in 
hopes of accomplishing these ends.28 
The purposes of the two Acts were to prevent fraud in the 
interstate offer or sale of securities,2e heal the economy,80 require 
securities dealers to fully disclose transactional information, and 
to protect against market manipulation.81 The two acts were 
meant to be complimentary of each other and the courts have 
tried to construe them harmoniously.82 
Each Act contains a major provision which constitutes the 
majority of claims that are involved in disputes between brokers 
and their clients. Section 12(2) of the Securities Act88 requires 
the full disclosure of material information concerning the offer 
or sales of securities by a broker, providing investors with a rem-
edy for any violation of this section. 
recovery."); See also Malcolm & Segall, The Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under Sec-
tion lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act: Should Wilko Be Extended?, 50 ALB. L.REV. 
725 (1987). 
28. See supra notes 2 and 11. 
29. See S. REP. No. 47. 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). "The purpose of this bill is to 
protect the investing public and honest business .... The aim is to prevent further ex-
ploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securities 
through misrepresentation; to place adequate and true information before the investor; 
to protect honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest presentation, against the competi-
tion afforded by dishonest securities offered to the public through crooked promotion; to 
restore the confidence of the prospective investor in his ability to select sound securities; 
to bring into productive channels of industry and development capital which has grown 
timid to the point of hoarding; and to aid in providing employment and restoring buying 
and consuming power." [d. 
30. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979)(referring to the remarks 
made by Reps. Kelly and Chapman and Sen. Norbeck in 77 CONGo REC. at 2925, 2935, 
and 3232 (1933)). 
31. See Ernst & Ernst V. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) ("The 1934 Act was 
intended principally to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices through 
regulation of stock transactions ... "); See also Note, Mixed Arbitrable and Nonarbitra-
ble Claims in Securities Litigation: Dean Witter Reynolds V. Byrd, 34 CATH. U.L.REV. 
525, 533 n.52 (1985). 
32. Rodriguez De Quijas, 109 S. Ct. at 1922. The Court stated that: "[T]he 1933 and 
1934 Acts should be construed harmoniously because they constitute interrelated compo-
nents of the federal regulatory scheme governing transactions in securities." [d. quoting 
in part Ernst & Ernst V. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976). The Court further stated 
that: "[T]he inconsistency between Wilko and McMahon undermines the essential ra-
tionale for a harmonious construction of the two statutes (1933 and 1934 Acts), which is 
to discourage litigants from manipulating their allegations merely to cast their claims 
under one of the securities laws rather than another." Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1922. 
33. Securities Act of 1933 section 12(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. section 771 (1985)). 
5
Malson: Securities Arbitration
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1991
410 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:405 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act34 is broad in 
its scope. Essentially, it is an anti-fraud provision that not only 
covers misrepresentation and omissions, but also failure to dis-
close and false statements made to buyers of securities.311 
C. THE COURT'S BATTLE WITH RECONCILING THE THREE ACTS 
The Supreme Court found that the two policies expressed 
by the Securities Acts and the Arbitration Act were seemingly at 
odds with each other. On the one hand, the Arbitration Act pro-
vided a means for "prompt, economical, and adequate solution 
of controversies through arbitration .... "38 While on the other 
hand, Congress sought to protect the rights of investors with 
their passage of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, forbidding 
waiver of any of those rights.87 
Commentators and the Court have recognized the tension 
that has existed between the Federal Arbitration Act and the 
Securities Acts.38 
Wilko v. Swan39 provided the Supreme Court with its first 
opportunity to try and reconcile and harmonize the Federal Ar-
bitration Act and the Securities Act of 1933. The court in Wilko 
was faced with deciding whether or not a claim brought under 
34. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 section lO(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988)) 
and S.E.C. Rule lO(b)(5) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.105-b (1989)). 
35. See S.E.C. Rule IOb(5) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1989)). The S.E.C. 
enacted Rule 10b(5) pursuant to the power it has under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, which created the S.E.C. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(l) (1982). Rule 10b(5) provides in 
part: "It shall be unlawful for any person ... to use or employ, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any secur-
ity not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 
36. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438. 
37. [d. 
38. See Malcolm & Segall, supra note 4 at 726 (conflict between the two policies 
creates the problem addressed by the article). 
39. In Wilko, an investor brought suit against an investment firm claiming that they 
had falsely represented the value of some stock that was purchased. The investor 
brought his claim under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. A contract between 
the investment firm and the customer contained an agreement to arbitrate. The invest-
ment firm sought to stay the trial pending arbitration. The district court denied the stay 
and the Court of appeals reversed the district court. See Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75 
(S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1952), rev'd, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
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section 12(2) of the Securities Act by an investor was arbitrable 
where a valid agreement had been signed to do so. The court 
stated that section 14 of the Securities Act, which voids any 
agreement or stipulation waiving any provision of the Act,40 pre-
vented the enforcement of predispute agreements to arbitrate. 
In its decision, the court declared that pre dispute agreements to 
arbitrate claims arising under Securities Act section 12(2) were 
not enforceable.41 
In its analysis, the court felt' that the congressional pur-
pose42 and mandate of the Securities Act overrode those con-
tained in the Federal Arbitration Act.n Clearly, the court felt 
that the arbitral system, as it existed in 1953, was inadequate to 
sufficiently protect investors.44 In light of these perceived inade-
quacies,4C1 the court felt that 12(2) claims "require the exercise of 
judicial direction to fairly assure their effectiveness. "46 
In post-Wilko decisions, the Supreme Court was again faced 
with trying to reconcile conflicts between the Securities Act, Ex-
change Act, and the Arbitration Act. In Scherk v. Alberto Cul-
ver,47 the enforcement of an arbitration clause was at issue for a 
claimed violation of section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act. The arbitration clause was contained in an agreement be-
40. Securities Act of 1933 § 14. Section 14 states that "any condition, stipulation, or 
provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provi-
sion of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." 
15 U.S.C. § 77n. 
41. Wilko, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). The court in Wilko limited its holding to agreements 
made prior to the existence of a controversy. See id. at 438 (Jackson, J., concurring). The 
courts have uniformly held that Wilko doesn't apply to agreements to arbitrate existing 
disputes. See e.g., Tullis v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 551 F.2d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 1977); Coenen 
v. RW. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1213 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 
(1972); Gardner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 433 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1970). 
42. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
43. 346 U.S. at 438. 
44. The court in Wilko discussed a number of these inadequacies. The Court ex-
pressed concern over the fact that arbitrators must make legal determinations "without 
judicial instruction on the law" and that the award can be made without a recorded 
reason. Thus, judicial review for error in the arbitrators decision would be virtually non-
existent. The court also felt that arbitration was unsuitable for cases requiring "subjec-
tive findings on the purpose and knowledge of an alleged violator". See 346 U.S. at 435-
37; see also McMahon 482 U.S. at 231. 
45. [d. 
46. 346 U.S. at 437. 
47. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). 
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tween an American company and a German company.48 In de-
ciding whether or not the agreement to arbitrate should be en-
forced the Court looked to the particular circumstances of the 
case.49 Important to their decision was the fact that the contract 
in question was truly international in context, involving an 
American corporation, a German citizen, and the sales of busi-
nesses organized under the laws of European countries. lIo In light 
of the international commercial contextll1 of the agreement, the 
court upheld the predispute agreement to arbitrate. liZ The court 
made a strong suggestion that Wilko might n'ot be applicable to 
claims arising under the 1934 Act. lls 
The Supreme Court was again confronted with the arbi-
trability of section 'lO(b) claims in Dean Witter Reynolds v. 
Byrdll4 and the arbitrability of federal antitrust claims in Mit-
subishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth.1I11 The issue before the court 
in Byrd was whether or not arbitration should be compelled 
where both section lO(b) and pendant state law claims were in-
volved.1I6 The Supreme Court, in reversing the lower courts, 
ruled affirmatively on this issue, relying on the language and the 
legislative history of the Federal Arbitration Act.1I7 The Court 
stated that where a case contains both arbitrable and non-arbi-
trable claims, arbitration of the pendant arbitrable claims must 
48.Id. 
49. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515. 
50.Id. 
51. The court in Scherk placed a great emphasis on the fact that the case was in an 
international setting. The court felt that a failure to uphold the agreement "would surely 
damage the fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil the willingness and 
ability of businessmen to enter into international agreement." Id. at 516. See also Mc-
Mahon, 482 U.S. at 255, n.ll (JustiCe Blackmun concurring and dissenting with Justices 
Brennan and Marshall). 
52. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519-20. 
53. The court stated: "A colorable argument could be made that even the semantic 
reasoning of the Wilko opinion does not control the case before us. There is no statutory 
counterpart of section 12(2) in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and neither section 
10(b) ... nor Rule 10 b-5 speaks of a private remedy .... " Id. at 513. 
54. Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985). 
55. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
56. See Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 215. 
57. Id. at 218. The Court, in determining whether the District Court should compel 
arbitration, looked to the Arbitration Act's language ("[Ilnsofar as the language of the 
Act guides our disposition of this case, we would conclude that agreements to arbitrate 
must be enforced .... ") and the Act's legislative history ("The legislative history of the 
Act establishes that the purpose behind its passage was to ensure judicial enforcement of 
privately made agreements to arbitrate.") Id. at 219. 
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol21/iss2/7
1991] SECURITIES ARBITRATION 413 
be compelled, ". . . even where the result would be the possibly 
inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different fo-
rums."GB Although the court did not rule directly on the applica-
bility of Wilko to Exchange Act claims, the decision did provide 
further support for the enforcement of predispute agreements to 
arbitrate. 
In Mitsubishi,G9 the arbitrability of a claim under federal 
antitrust law in an international commercial setting was at is-
sue.60 The Court reasoned that a bifurcated process was neces-
sary in determining whether or not arbitration clauses should be 
enforced.61 The first step was to determine if the agreement en-
compassed statutory issues and secondly, consider whether any 
legal constraints, external to the agreement of the parties, pro-
hibited the arbitration of those issues.82 The court again dis-
played its strong support of the FAA citing that "[q]uestions of 
arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the 
federal policy favoring arbitration.. "63 
The decisions in Scherk, Byrd, and Mitsubishi led to the 
inevitable decision by the Supreme Court in McMahon that 
predispute agreements to arbitrate claims under section lO(b) of \ 
the Securities Exchange Act were enforceable.6' The recent deci-
sion by the court in Rodriguez De Quijas u. Shearson/ American 
Express expressly overruled Wilko and declared that predispute 
agreements to arbitrate claims arising under the Securities Act 
58. [d. at 217. The Federal Courts of Appeals were divided on this issue. The 5th, 
9th, and 11th circuits relied on the doctrine of "intertwining", whereby arbitrable and 
non-arbitrable claims that are "sufficiently intertwined factually and legally" may be 
tried together in a federal court, even when faced with a motion to compel the arbitra-
tion of the arbitrable claim. The 6th, 7th, and 8th circuits have held that the District 
Courts do not have the discretion to deny a motion to compel arbitration where both 
arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims are involved. [d. at 216-17. 
59. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 614. 
60. A car manufacturer (Mitsubishi) brought suit against a car dealer (Soler) for a 
variety of claims arising out of an alleged breach of a sales agreement between the par-
ties. The agreement contained a clause that provided for arbitration of any disputes 
before the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association. Soler counterclaimed asserting, 
inter alia, antitrust violations. The District Court ordered arbitration of the antitrust 
claims, relying on the Supreme Court decision in Scherk. The Court of Appeals reversed 
insofar as the District Court's order to arbitrate the antitrust claims. 
61. [d. at 628. 
62. [d. 
63. [d. at 626, citing Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25. 
64. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238. 
9
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were enforceable.86 Thus the court has finally declared that 
Wilko was incorrectly decided88 and has fully recognized that 
the system of arbitration is adequate to ensure the purpose and 
intent of the Securities Act and Exchange Act as set forth by the 
Congress.87 
III. THE PREDISPUTE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE: 
CLAIMS THAT ARE COVERED AND THE EXTENT OF 
ENFORCEMENT 
A. TYPICAL ARBITRATION CLAUSES 
A customer desiring to transact business with a securities 
broker88 today has a number of choices when making their selec-
tion. There are full service brokers and discount brokers, both of 
whom provide a variety of services. The full service brokerage 
house usually assigns an individual to the customer who be-
comes the investor's personal account executive. Upon the for-
mation of this relationship, customers are typically asked to sign 
a customer agreement form which will contain information 
about the investor such as their financial status, investment 
goals, and experience in investing and dealing in the securities 
market. Additionally, the nature and extent of the relationship 
with the broker that the investor can expect89 is usually 
explained. 
Along with the rules and regulations governing the relation-
ship, the customer agreement forms will often contain an arbi-
65. Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1922. 
66. In concluding that Wilko was incorrectly decided, the Supreme Court stated the 
purpose of such a ruling: "Although we are normally and properly reluctant to overturn 
our decisions construing statutes, we have done so to achieve a uniform interpretation of 
similar statutory language, [citations omitted] and to correct a seriously erroneous inter-
pretation of statutory language that would undermine congressional policy as expressed 
in other legislation [citations omitted]. Both purposes would be served here by overrul-
ing the Wilko decision." [d. at 1922. 
67. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233; see also supra note 16. 
68. In this article, a securities broker will also be referred to as a "broker" or "stock 
broker". For the purposes and scope of this article, the brokers referred to are primarily 
those that handle retail customer accounts. 
69. Customer agreements vary as to their content depending on the broker and the 
type of account that is involved. Typically, brokers will have different types of agree-
ments depending on whether it is a cash, margin, or option account. This is especially 
true with respect to whether or not there is an arbitration clause contained within it. See 
infra note 120. 
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tration clause. The typical arbitration clause contains language 
to the effect that "any controversy arising out of the broker/cli-
ent relationship be settled by arbitration."70 The clause may 
specify the arbitral forum and the rules which will govern the 
process, often letting the customer choose from the forums listed 
in the agreement.71 
The arbitration clause contained in a customer agreement is 
now more that just "boilerplate" language.72 The language of the 
clause must be highlighted by distinguishable type, in outline 
form, and noticeable to the customer.7S Additionally, the lan-
guage of the clause must inform the customer that they, by sign-
ing the agreement, will be waiving their rights to court 
remedies.74 
Recently, the Court of Appeals of New York ruled that ab-
sent an express writing limiting the arbitrable forum, a customer 
may elect to arbitrate their claim before the American Arbitra-
tion Association (AAA) instead of one of the securities industry 
sponsored forums.7Ii This ability of a customer to elect to arbi-
trate their claim before the AAA came about as a result of how 
the customer agreement was worded with respect to arbitrating 
future disputes.78 
70. Typical arbitration clauses in retail customer agreements may also include which 
disputes may be arbitrated and may also contain where and under whose rules arbitra-
tion will occur. 
71. Forums available for arbitration include the systems available under the Self 
Regulatory Organizations (SRO's), the American Arbitration Association, and perhaps 
private judging. 
72. See generally Adams v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 888 F.2d 
696 (10th Cir. 1989) (customer claims of a customer agreement as being a form, boiler-
plate contract). 
73. See S.E.C. order, infra note 101 at 21153. 
74. [d. 
75. Cowen & Co. v. Anderson, 76 N.Y.2d 318 (1990). See also infra note 101 and 
accompanying text. 
76. The customer agreement in Cowen provided for arbitration in "accordance with 
the rules then in effect" at a number of the SRO's. Under the rules of the AMEX's 
constitution (often referred to as the AMEX Window), AAA arbitration was permitted. 
For a discussion of the "AMEX Window" and its ramifications see Franklin, Amex Win-
dow Debate; Cowen Renews Struggle over Arbitration Forums, N.Y.L.J., July 19, 1990 at 
5. 
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B. ARBITRABLE CLAIMS 
As indicated in the previous section, typical arbitration 
clauses usually do not specify exactly which type of controver-
sies between the customer and the broker that will be arbitrable. 
"Any controversy" is a broad area.77 The anti-fraud provisions 
contained in section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and sec-
tion lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act are by far the most 
common claims brought by customers against brokers.78 The Su-
preme Court has indicated that the arbitration system as it ex-
ists today is fully capable of addressing those claims where there 
has been an agreement to do SO.79 Any question about the en-
forceability of arbitration agreements where sections 12(2) and 
10(b) are claimed, have been answered affirmatively.80 
Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act claims are not 
the only claims that have been brought against brokers where 
questions of arbitration have arose. The Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act81 (RICO) is another claim which 
clients have leveled against their brokers. RICO's main advan-
tage to the customer when asserting a claim against their broker 
is the treble damage provision contained in section 1964(c).82 
Prior to Shearson/American Express v. McMahon,83 civil 
RICO claims concerning securities disputes were generally not 
held subject to arbitration.8' The court in McMahon, in address-
77. Brokerage firms in-house resolution procedures vary, but all have internal meth-
ods of dealing with disputes that may arise between brokers and their clients. 
78. See e.g., Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 109 S. Ct. 
1917 (1989); Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
79. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233 (the expansive power of the S.E.C. to ensure the 
adequacy of the arbitration procedures of the SRO's); see also supra notes 66-67 and 
accompanying text and supra note 16. 
80. Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1922 (1989); McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238 (1987). 
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988). 
82. [d.; see also McMahon at 241, quoting Representative Steiger about the reme-
dial purpose of the provision: "It is the intent of this body, I am certain, to see that 
innocent parties who are the victims of organized crime have a right to obtain proper 
redress ... " [d. at 240. The court also noted that "the treble-damages cause of ac-
tion ... seeks primarily to enable an injured competitor to gain compensation for that 
injury." The court was displaying the importance of the treble-damages provision of § 4 
of the Clayton Act and analogizing its legislative intent to that of the RICO statute. [d. 
at 240. 
83. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
84. See e.g., Page v. Moseley, Ha11garten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc. 806 F.2d 291, 
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ing the RICO claim brought by an investor, relied heavily on 
their decision in Mitsubishi.8D By looking at the legislative text 
and history of the statute, the court determined that there was 
nothing contained in it that evidenced a Congressional intent to 
exclude civil RICO claims from the "dictates of the Arbitration 
Act."8s The major arguments presented to the court in McMa-
hon which would preclude the submission of civil RICO claims 
to arbitration included the complexity of the RICO claim,87 the 
overlap of criminal and civil provisions, and the public interest 
involved in RICO enforcement.88 These arguments were dis-
missed by the court declaring that the RICO claims could effec-
tively be vindicated in an arbitral forum.89 
C. ATTEMPTS To CIRCUMVENT ARBITRATION 
Section 2 of the Arbitration Act declares that as a matter of 
federal law, arbitration agreement "shall be valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract."90 Defenses available 
to the investor seeking to keep their claim out of the arbitration 
process will become increasingly more difficult to assert. In the 
past, investors have claimed that the arbitration clauses con-
tained within customer agreements were obtained by fraud, or 
that the contracts themselves were adhesive.91 
298 (1st Cir. 1986) (" ... we believe the Congressional intent [of RICO] to have been one 
of precluding arbitration ... "); Tashea v. Bache, Halsey, Stuarts, Shields, Inc., 802 F.2d 
1337, 1339 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that RICO claims based on violations of the 1933 
and 1934 Acts are not subject to compelled arbitration); Jacobson v. Merrill, Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 797 F.2d 1197, 1202 (3d Cir. 1986) RICO claims based on 10b-5 
violations not subject to arbitration). 
85. See McMahon 482 U.S. at 239-41. 
86. Id. at 242. 
87. Id. at 239. The Court responded to this argument by relying on its decision in 
Mitsubishi where it stated that "potential complexity should not suffice to ward off arbi-
tration." Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 
at 633). The Court further stated that antitrust matters are "every bit as complex as 
RICO claims", that the arbitral system's "adaptability and access to expertise" could 
handle complex claims, id., and that "arbitral tribunals are readily capable of handling 
the factual and legal complexities .... " Id. at 232. 
88. Id. at 239-41. 
89. Id. at 242. The court stated that the "McMahons may effectively vindicate their 
RICO claim in an arbitral forum .... " 
90. Id. at 226 quoting section 2 of the F.A.A., 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). 
91. See Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 109 S. Ct. at 1921 
(1989) (record devoid of facts supporting agreement to arbitrate as adhesive); Cohen v. 
13
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Claims by investors that they were fraudulently induced to 
sign or misled as to the effect of signing a customer agreement 
that contains' an arbitration clause usually fail to keep a claim 
from being arbitrated.92 It is well established that general at-
tacks on the entire customer agreement as being fraudulently in-
duced are subject to arbitration.9s Specific attacks on the arbi-
tration clause itself could conceivably permit court adjudication 
of these issues.9• Allegations of fraud as they relate to the clause 
itself will not necessarily allow the dispute to enter into a judi-
cial forum.911 A broker that fails to inform the client as to the 
existence and effect of the clause has not committed actionable 
fraud unless there is a duty to disclose.98 Since a broker does not 
have a duty to disclose or explain an arbitration clause con-
tained within a customer agreement,97 claims of fraud as they 
relate to the clause itself will also fail. 
Asserting that the arbitration clause is a part of a contract 
Wed bush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1988) (claim of fraud for failure to 
disclose effect of arbitration clause). 
92. See Bitkowski v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 866 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 
1988)(broker did not conceal nor discuss the contents of the customer agreement); Russo 
v. Simmons, 723 F. Supp. 220,224 (S.D. N.Y. 1989)(customer claim of fraudulent induce-
ment to be decided by arbitrator). 
93. Curtis v. Newhard, Cook & Co., Inc., 725 F.Supp 1072, 1074 (E.D. Mo. 1989). 
See e.g., Cohen v. Wed bush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 286 (9th Cir. 1988); Villa 
Garcia v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 833 F.2d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 1987); 
Bhatia v. Johnston, 818 F.2d 418, 421-22 (5th Cir. 1987); Benoay v. Prudential-Bache 
Sec. Inc., 805 F.2d 1437, 1441 (llth Cir. 1986). 
94. Prima Paint Co. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 403-4 (1967). The Court 
explained that if the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself, an 
issue which goes to the "making" of the agreement to arbitrate, the federal court may 
proceed to adjudicate it. [d. 
95. See Cohen, 841 F.2d at 286-87. The customer contended that Wedbush's failure 
to inform them of the ramifications of the arbitration clause was not aimed at the entire 
contract but only on their assent to the arbitration clause. The court stated that: "This 
does not mean, however, that the Cohens are entitled to a jury trial. In order for a mere 
omission to constitute actionable fraud, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that the de-
fendant had a duty to disclose the fact at issue." [d. at 286-87. 
96. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (failure to disclose is fraud 
only when there is a duty to do so); Cohen, 841 F.2d at 287 (no duty to disclose or 
explain terms of a written contract). 
97. Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 681 F.Supp 1045, 1052 (S.D. N.Y. 1988) (brokers 
are not required as a matter of law to disclose or explain arbitration clauses); see also 
Adams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 888 F.2d 696, 701 (lOth Cir. 1989) 
(When an investor signs an agreement, the law presumes that one has read that which 
one has signed); Pierson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(failure by an investor to inquire about the effects of the arbitration clause can't be used 
to avoid arbitration). 
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of adhesion is also rarely successful in keeping claims out of 
arbitration.98 
IV. ADVANTAGES OF ARBITRATION IN BROKER-CLI-
ENT DISPUTES: THE ADEQUACY OF THE SYSTEM 
A. ADVANTAGES OF ARBITRATION 
This section of the note will explore the positive effects and 
advantages of the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez when a 
dispute that arises between securities brokers and their clients is 
arbitrated. Customers, effectively shut out of the courts after 
signing an agreement that contains an arbitration clause, are 
nonetheless still adequately protected as was intended by Con-
gress when the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act 
were passed.99 The mistrust of the arbitration system as dis-
played by the court in Wilko has deteriorated to the point of 
near non-existence100 and the regulatory changes101 that have 
taken place since Wilko have cast doubt aside as to the effec-
tiveness of arbitration. 
98. See e.g., Rodriguez De Quijas, 109 S. Ct at 1921; Adams, 888 F.2d at 700; Co-
hen, 841 F.2d at 286; Surman v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 61 
(8th Cir. 1984) (rejection of argument that brokerage agreements were contracts of adhe-
sion); Schuster v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 699 F. Supp. 271 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (rejection of 
argument that customer agreements were contracts of adhesion that were lacking mutu-
ality of obligation). 
99. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. 
100. See Rodriguez at 1920. 
101. See, Self Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes 
by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 
and the American Stock Exchange Inc. Relating to the Arbitration Process and the Use 
of Predispute Arbitration Clauses, 54 Fed. Reg. 21144 (1989). This order approved a 
number of changes filed by the SRO's with the S.E.C. in response to an S.E.C. letter to 
the SICA which indicated a number of areas that arbitration reform might be necessary. 
The areas of approved changes included: 
1. Service of Pleadings 
2. Classification of Arbitrators 
3. Arbitrator Disclosure and Background Information to be disclosed to the Parties 
4. Appointment of Replacement Arbitrators on Panel 
5. Availability of Small Claims Procedures and the Number of Arbitrators Required 
to Hear a Claim 
6. Discovery 
7. Preservation of Record 
8. Content and Availability of Award 
9. Arbitration Fees 
10. Predispute Arbitration Clauses 
15
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These rule changes were the result of actions by the 
S.E.C.I02 which saw the need for changes in the current system 
of arbitration and the rules regulating it. The Securities Indus-
try Conference on Arbitration (SICA)103 and the Self Regulatory 
Organizations (SRO's)1°· have worked to ensure that the arbitra-
tion system is both fair and efficient. The obvious advantage 
that will be enjoyed by the customer are the time and cost sav-
ings that will be realized by the submission of disputes to arbi-
tration. lOIl Undoubtedly, these advantages will extend to the bro-
ker as well. 
The greatest savings on costs will result from the reduced 
time spent in settling a claim through arbitration as opposed to 
litigation. loe This reduction in time is the direct result of expe-
dited filing, discovery, and hearing procedures. lo7 This equates 
into lesser legal costs as a percentage of arbitral awards. lOS 
The fairness of the process of arbitration is another impor-
tant advantage to the securities customer. The composition of 
the arbitral panels are composed of a majority of individuals 
who are not affiliated with the securities industry and a minority 
102. See id., referring to the letter from Richard G. Ketchum, Director, Division of 
Market Regulation, S.E.C. to JamesE. Buck, Senior Vice-President, New York Stock 
Exchange Inc., dated September 10, 1987. 
103. The Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration is comprised of a represen-
tative from each of the self-regulatory organizations which administers an arbitration 
program, a representative from the securities industry, and four public representatives. 
104. The SRO's which have an arbitration program are the New York Stock Ex-
change, Pacific Stock Exchange, National Association of Securities Dealers, American 
Stock Exchange, Chicago Board of Exchange, Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, 
Boston Stock Exchange, Cincinnati Stock Exchange, and Philadelphia Stock Exchange. 
105. See Note, Classwide Arbitration and JOb-5 Claims in the Wake of Shearson/ 
American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 380, 391 (1989); See also 
Fletcher, Learning to Live With the Federal Arbitration Act-Securities Litigation in a 
Post-McMahon World, 37 EMORY L.J. 99, 122 (1988). . 
106. See Note, Arbitration of Securities Disputes: Rodriguez and New Arbitration 
Rules Leave Investors Holding a Mixed Bag, 65 IND. L.J. 697, 707 (1990) (599 days for 
litigated claims and 434 days for arbitrated claims). But see Hayes & Hagedorn, Arbitra-
tion Saves Money, But Not Time, Wall St. J., Sept. 5, 1990, at B7, col. 1 (referring to a 
study by the Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice showing that arbitrated cases 
took an average of 285 days and nonarbitrated cases 282 days). 
107. See S.E.C. order, supra note 101 at 21145. 
108. See Note supra note 106, appendix (letter from Deloitte Haskins & Sells to the 
New York Stock Exchange (undated) showing that in a survey that it conducted, the 
legal costs as a percentage of awards was 28.75% for arbitrated claims and 79.66% for 
litigated claims). 
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of those who are in some way connected with the industry.loe 
Arbitrators are now subject to closer scrutiny as to their indus-
try affiliations, both present and past, which goes far in assuring 
that the investor will be adequately protected.llo The past prac-
tice of not keeping a record of the arbitration proceedings no 
longer exists. lll Arbitrators are now required to keep a record of 
the proceedings and allow access to these records by each of the 
parties.112 Having a record of the proceedings will enable the 
parties to more readily appeal an arbitral award by allowing a 
court a means of reviewing the proceedings. 113 
Perhaps the greatest advantage to the customer in the re-
cent rule changes will result from the customer's heightened 
awareness of knowing what arbitration is and how it will affect 
them in the event that a dispute does arise in the broker-client 
relationship. The highlighting of the arbitration clause and the 
brief explanation of what it means1l4 will put prudent investors 
on notice so that they may arm themselves with the knowledge 
necessary to make an informed decision. 
B. INVESTOR CHOICE 
The Court of Appeals of New York decision in Cowen v. 
AndersonlllS seems to suggest that a choice of forum, other than 
those sponsored by the securities industry, will be available to 
109. See S.E.C. order, supra note 101; see also Note, supra note 106, at 710. 
110. See id., see also National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Code of Arbi-
tration Procedure § 19 (1988). 
111. S.E.C. order, supra note at 21151. 
112. [d. 
113. The standards used by a court in vacating an award are found in 9 U.S.C. § 10 
(1982). They include in part: 
1) Where the award was procured through corruption, fraud, or undue means. 
2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators. 
3) Arbitrator misconduct. 
114. S.E.C. order, supra note 101 at 21153. 
115. Cowen & Co. v. Anderson, 76 N.Y.2d 318 (1990). In Cowen, the customer, An-
derson, sought to arbitrate a claim before the American Arbitration Association (AAA) in 
accordance with the account agreements he had signed which contained clauses provid-
ing that disputes be settled through arbitration in accordance with the rules of the 
NYSE, AMEX, or NASD. Cowen sought a stay of arbitration before the AAA contending 
arbitration must take place in one of the three listed SRO's. The lower court denied the 
stay and the Court of Appeals affirmed. It stated that under the rules of the AMEX, the 
AAA is a forum in which an investor may seek arbitration unless there has been an 
express agreement to limit the forum. 
17
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investors. The American Arbitration Association116 (AAA) is. one 
such forum. It can provide for the resolution of disputes between 
brokers and their customers in a setting away from the securities 
industry. 
The AAA has its own set of rules tailored especially for se-
curities disputes. In 1987, the AAA issued Securities Arbitration 
Rules l17 (SAR) which, while similar to Commercial Arbitration 
Rules, specifically address the special needs of securities dis-
putes.118 Since the SAR's were first published, there has been "a 
positive user response [indicating] that AAA securities arbitra-
tion is perceived to offer a fair and impartial means of resolving 
customer-broker disputes."119 
Of course, the ultimate investor choice is whether or not to 
enter into an agreement containing an arbitration clause. There 
is nothing which mandates an arbitration clause in a customer 
agreement with a broker other than each firm's decision to use 
them.120 There will always be brokers whose customer agree-
ments do not contain arbitration clauses if there is a market for 
such agreements. l2l However, as investors become more aware of 
the advantages of arbitration as a means of settling disputes and 
the perceived unfairness and bias of arbitration disappears,122 
the predispute agreement to arbitrate claims will become more 
commonplace. 
116. Friedman, Arbitration 1989, Securities: The Latest Developments, 115 (1989). 
The American Arbitration Association is a nationwide organization with a panel of over 
50,000 qualified arbitrators. Approximately 1400 of these arbitrators are qualified to hear 
securities disputes by either industry affiliation or by knowledge with no industry affilia-
tion. [d. at 117. 
117. American Arbitration Association, Securities Arbitration Rules (amended 
1989). 
118. See Friedman, AAA's New Securities Arbitration Rules, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 8, 
1987, at 1, col. 1. 
119. See Friedman, supra note 116 at 119. 
120. A study by the S.E.C. indicated that only 39"10 of the brokerage firms had cus-
tomer agreements that contained predispute arbitration clauses for cash accounts. How-
ever, the study also showed that customer agreements for margin and options accounts 
did contain arbitration clauses. See S.E.C. Order, supra note 101 at 21153. 
121. See S.E.C. Order supra note 101 at 21153. In the order, the S.E.C. stated that 
it was "hopeful that competitive forces will result in some firms offering margin or op-
tions accounts without such [arbitration) agreements." But see Note, supra note 106 at 
718. 
122. See L.A. Times, Dec. 13,1987, part 4, at I, col. 4. "Many investors ... perceive 
these arbitration systems as unfairly stacked in favor of brokers, in part because panels 
are selected and administered by the securities industry." 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Since the Supreme Court's ruling in Wilko u. Swan, there 
has been a continuous erosion of its holding, resulting in its 
eventual demise. Subsequent decisions have highlighted the er-' 
roneous holding of Wilko and recognized the advantages that ar-
bitration affords the investor. Recognition of these advantages is 
due in part to the regulatory changes within the established sys-
tem of arbitration, the disappearance of "judicial hostility to-
ward arbitration,"123 and the availability of alternative forums. 
The rule changes in the arbitration system will heighten in-
vestors' awareness as to the effects of signing a customer agree-
ment with a broker that contains an arbitration clause. Addi-
tionally, investors should take it upon themselves to become 
more aware of the significance of having to arbitrate any dispute 
that may arise from their relationship with their broker. Armed 
with such knowledge, investors will recognize arbitration as a 
fair and efficient means of resolving disputes with their brokers. 
Gregory N. Malson* 
123. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992. 
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